STATE OF FLORIDA STATE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION

CAROL WARTENBERG,)	
Petitioner,)	
vs.)	SBA Case No. 2015-3522
STATE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATIO) N,)	
Respondent.)	
)	

FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

On August 11, 2016, an administrative law judge ("ALJ") from the Division of Administrative Hearings ("DOAH") submitted his Order Determining that Relief Requested by Petitioner is Unavailable in an Administrative Proceeding and Closing File (hereafter "Order") to the Respondent, State Board of Administration ("SBA"), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A. Subsequent to the Order, Respondent filed a Motion for a Final Order of Dismissal (Exhibit B). Petitioner then filed an Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Final Order of Dismissal with Prejudice (Exhibit C). Respondent then filed a Reply to Petitioner's Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Final Order of Dismissal with Prejudice (Exhibit D). The matter is now pending before the Chief of Defined Contribution Programs for final agency action.

BACKGROUND

On December 7, 2015, the Petitioner, a member of the Florida Retirement System ("FRS") Investment Plan, had submitted a request for intervention with the SBA asking

that she be allowed to return to the FRS Pension Plan despite the fact she had already used her allowed second election as provided under Section 121.4501(4)(g), Florida Statutes to join the Investment Plan in 2008. She also requested that her second election be treated as if it had never occurred, such that any required buy in amount would be waived. Petitioner stated that the only reason she switched to the Investment Plan in 2008 was to protect her spouse since same sex marriages in Florida were not recognized at the time and under the Pension Plan she would not be able to designate her same sex spouse as a beneficiary of her Pension Plan benefit if she were to die. She would, however, be entitled to name anyone as a beneficiary under the Investment Plan. In 2011, Petitioner and her domestic partner were legally married in Iowa and in 2015, Florida recognized the marriage.

The SBA denied her request, and Petitioner filed a request for an informal administrative hearing. At that informal hearing, Petitioner raised certain issues that were determined to be disputed issues of material fact. She also raised the issue as to whether or not the denial of her request by the SBA to return to the Pension Plan violated her constitutional rights. Since there were disputed material facts and since it appeared the Petitioner was raising an "as applied" constitutional challenge, the Petitioner's case was transferred to DOAH to proceed with her Administrative challenge while preserving her constitutional challenge for a district court of appeal once a Final Order was issued.

The day before the scheduled hearing, Petitioner's counsel filed a motion (Exhibit E) requesting that an order be issued determining that DOAH lacked the authority both to decide the constitutional issues raised by Petitioner, and to require the SBA to pay the required buy in amount.

The SBA is requesting that Petitioner's case be dismissed with prejudice. Petitioner is arguing the case should be dismissed without prejudice. Petitioner offers no legal authority for Petitioner's position. Petitioner merely states that it is "trite law" that an order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction can <u>never</u> be entered with prejudice since such an order does not constitute a ruling on the merits. *See*, Exhibit C, paragraph 4.

DISCUSSION

When Petitioner had requested DOAH to issue the Order, Petitioner noted that the Order would allow Petitioner to exhaust her administrative remedies and bring an appropriate action in state or federal court pursuant to 42 USC §1983 (the federal law, popularly known as "Section 1983," that allows lawsuits for violations of constitutional rights) and related federal statutes. *See*, Exhibit E, page 4.

Generally, when choosing between circuit court and administrative forums, there is a duty to first exhaust administrative remedies before turning to a court of general jurisdiction. *Department of General Services v. Willis,* 344 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). The rationale for this requirement is that there is an "impressive arsenal" of administrative remedies that may prevent a court action. *Id.* at 590. However, the exhaustion principle has certain exceptions, one of which occurs when a claim challenges the facial constitutionality of a statute. Originally recognized in *Willis,* this exception later was refined. In *Key Haven Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund,* 427 So.2d 153 (Fla. 1982), it was held that a challenge to a statute's constitutionality could be brought either in an administrative forum or in circuit court. While only a judicial court could actually rule on a statute's constitutionality, the *Key Haven* court noted that a litigant could administratively

adjudicate all other facets of his or her argument and later raise the statute's constitutionality on appeal. However, the court noted that once a single forum was chosen, the other forum was foreclosed. *Id.* at 157.

Further, Petitioner has asserted from the time of filing her petition that there were certain other grounds besides constitutional violations that could allow her to return to the Pension Plan. Such other grounds, such as a misapplication of a particular statute or rule, could have been litigated in an administrative proceeding. However, Petitioner chose not to do so. As such, Petitioner should be foreclosed from raising in the future any claim that currently is ripe and with the SBA's power to determine. *See, Florida Department of Transportation v. Juliano*, 801 So.2d 101, 105 (Fla. 2001) in which the court held that the doctrine of res judicata bars not only issues that were actually raised, but also those that could have been raised but that were not raised in the first case; and *Alderwoods Group, Inc. v. Garcia*, 119 So.3d 497 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), in which the court recognized that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to prior administrative proceedings.

Although a dismissal of a complaint for lack of jurisdiction does not operate as an adjudication on the merits, "... it is proper to designate such a dismissal as being 'with prejudice' in order to preclude it from being refiled in that court where there is a lack of jurisdiction." However, such dismissal does not operate to bar the filing of a suit thereon in a separate cause in a court having jurisdiction. *Miami Super Cold Co. v. Giffin Industries, Inc.*, 178 So.2d 604, 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965).

As such, indicating the dismissal is with prejudice will not prevent Petitioner from bringing a claim in another forum that the SBA lacked jurisdiction to resolve. *See, Felder*

v. State, Dept. of Management Services, Div. of Retirement, 993 So.2d 1031 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

ORDERED

The Order Determining that Relief Requested by Petitioner is Unavailable in an Administrative Proceeding and Closing File is adopted in its entirety and is incorporated herein by reference. Petitioner's matter hereby is dismissed with prejudice.

Any party to this proceeding has the right to seek judicial review of the Final Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, by the filing of a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, with the Clerk of the State Board of Administration in the Office of the General Counsel, State Board of Administration, 1801 Hermitage Boulevard, Suite 100, Tallahassee, Florida, 32308, and by filing a copy of the Notice of Appeal accompanied by the applicable filing fees with the appropriate District Court of Appeal. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days from the date the Final Order is filed with the Clerk of the State Board of Administration.

DONE AND ORDERED this ______day of December 2016, in Tallahassee, Florida.

STATE OF FLORIDA STATE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION

Joan B. Haseman

Chief of Defined Contribution Programs State Board of Administration 1801 Hermitage Boulevard, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (850) 488-4406

doan B Haseman

FILED ON THIS DATE PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.52, FLORIDA STATUTES WITH THE DESIGNATED CLERK OF THE STATE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION, RECEIPT OF WHICH IS HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED.

Tina Joanos Agency Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Final Order was sent via electronic mail to Anthony V. Falzon, LL.M (Cantab.), Esq., Counsel fro Petitioner, afalzon@miami-law.net and by UPS to Simon, Schindler & Sandberg, LLC, 2650 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida 33137, and by electronic mail to Brian Newman and Brandice Dickson, Esq., at Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, P.A., P.O. Box 10095, Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2095, brian@pennington.com and brandi@pennington.com, this day of December, 2016.

Ruth A. Smith

Assistant General Counsel State Board of Administration of Florida 1801 Hermitage Boulevard Suite 100

Tallahassee, FL 32308

EXHIBIT A

STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

CAROL WARTENBERG,
Petitioner,

VS.

Case No. 16-3123

STATE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION,

Respondent.	•
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ORDER DETERMINING THAT RELIEF REQUESTED BY PETITIONER IS UNAVAILABLE IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING AND CLOSING FILE

By request filed on August 11, 2016, Petitioner requested an order stating that the relief that she is seeking in this administrative proceeding is unavailable. The final hearing in the case is set for tomorrow. The Administrative Law Judge's administrative assistant called counsel for Respondent to learn if he opposed the request. Unfortunately, due to the manner of service, Respondent's counsel was unaware of the request. The parties thus asked for a 30-day continuance, so Respondent could respond to the request. However, Respondent opposes the relief sought in its Pre-hearing Statement filed on August 5, 2016, and there is no need to subject the parties to additional time or expense at the administrative level where no effective relief is available.

For the purpose of this order, the facts set forth in Petitioner's Pre-hearing Statement filed on August 8, 2016, are deemed correct, as is the law set forth in Respondent's Pre-hearing Statement. Essentially, Petitioner elected to participate in the FRS defined benefit plan, which is known as the FRS Pension Plan, when she commenced FRS-covered employment in 2003. At the time, since 1999, Petitioner and a same-sex partner were registered domestic partners under a Broward County ordinance that provided that domestic partners of Broward County employees were entitled to all employment benefits that were extended to spouses and dependents. However, Petitioner was an employee of the Broward County School Board, not Broward County, so the ordinance was not applicable. Petitioner learned in 2007 that her domestic partner would not qualify as a joint annuitant

under the FRS Pension Plan, so, in 2008, Petitioner made her second election, as provided by Florida statutes, to change from the FRS Pension Plan to the FRS Investment Plan, which is a defined contribution plan that allowed her to name her domestic partner as a beneficiary. Respondent processed the second election, and the grace period within which Petitioner could revoke her second election has long since expired. Neither Florida statutes nor Respondent's rules permit a third election.

In 2011, Petitioner and her domestic partner were legally married in Iowa, and, in 2015, Florida recognized this marriage. Following Florida's recognition of her same-sex marriage, Petitioner requested Respondent for the relief set forth in the following paragraph.

In her Pre-hearing Statement, Petitioner sets out the relief that she seeks in this case: 1) "annulling" or rescinding her 2008 second election; 2) restoring her to the FRS Pension Plan as though the 2008 second election had never taken place; and 3) relieving Petitioner of any liability for the payback amount of about \$30,000 representing the amount by which the value of her FRS Investment Plan is exceeded by the amount of her FRS Pension Plan, if her second election were annulled or rescinded. In her Pre-hearing Statement and request filed today, Petitioner asks for a retroactive application of two recent federal decisions, including one addressing Florida law, requiring the recognition of same-sex marriages and a declaration that her 2011 marriage relates back to 1999 when the parties registered under the Broward County ordinance.

The Pre-hearing Statement describes Petitioner's case as an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of, it appears, Florida statutes and Respondent's rules limiting FRS plan participants to two elections and statutes and rules that presently, or at one time, limited the class of persons who could be named as joint annuitants under the FRS Pension Plan to spouses (any other eligible persons being irrelevant to this case).

The presence of constitutional claims in administrative proceedings is addressed in Key Haven Associated Enterprises, Inc.v.Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 427 So. 153 (Fla. 1982). In general, this case states that, as a matter of "judicial policy," state courts, which have the sole power to consider constitutional issues, should exercise restraint in intervening in pending administrative proceedings to support the integrity of the administrative

process and allow the executive branch to carry out its constitutional duties. <u>Id.</u> at 156-57. The court considered three scenarios: a facial challenge to a statute; a facial challenge to a rule implementing a constitutional statute; and an as-applied challenge to an agency's implementation of a constitutional statute or rule. <u>Id.</u> at 157. The court noted that no judicial restraint need be shown in the case of a facial challenge to a statute due to the waste of resources in administrative litigation that can have no bearing on the ultimate judicial determination. <u>Id.</u> The court noted that courts should allow a facial challenge to a rule to conclude administratively because the administrative process, once exhausted, may dispense with the necessity of the constitutional challenge. <u>Id.</u> at 157-58.

The court noted that courts should allow an as-applied challenge to a rule to conclude administratively to give the agency a chance to reach a measured determination based on a full evidentiary record. Id. at 158.

However, <u>Key Haven</u> is distinguishable. The agency in <u>Key Haven</u> was presented with a routine request for a dredge-and-fill permit, which it had denied preliminarily, applying various statutes and rules detailing the procedure for processing permit applications and the substantive law to be applied in doing so. The developer was not asking the agency to set aside or rewrite these statutes and rules, but instead wanted an expeditious judicial declaration that the denial of the permit constituted inverse condemnation, so, immediately after the DOAH recommended order was issued, the developer sought judicial relief.

By contrast, in the present case, Petitioner asks Respondent to set aside and rewrite clear statutes and rules that prohibit third elections and, at least historically, limited the class of persons who could be named as joint annuitants for an FRS Pension Plan--all in reliance on recent court decisions. (Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to consider the extent to which, on these facts, the sought-after relief of annulment, rescission, and damages are available administratively or only judicially.) Nothing in Key Haven suggests that an agency or Administrative Law Judge has such power.

Based on the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that the request of Petitioner is granted, the hearing set for tomorrow is cancelled, and the DOAH file is

closed. Late in the morning of August 11, 2016, the administrative assistant called both attorneys and advised them of this ruling.

DONE AND ORDERED this 11th day of August, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

ROBERT E. MEALE

Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings
The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675
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Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 2016.

COPIES FURNISHED:

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EXHIBIT B

STATE OF FLORIDA STATE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION

CAROL WARTENBERG,

Petitioner.

VS.

CASE NO. 2015-3522

STATE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION.

Responder	ıt.
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RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Respondent, State Board of Administration ("SBA"), files this Motion for Final Order of Dismissal, and says:

- 1. On December 7, 2015, the Petitioner submitted a request for intervention with the SBA asking that she be allowed to return to the Pension Plan even though she used her second election to join the Investment Plan in 2003. Petitioner alleged that she moved to the Pension Plan in 2003 because Florida law did not recognize the legitimacy of a same sex marriage at that time and that she moved to the Investment Plan because the Pension Plan would not allow her to name her same sex spouse as a beneficiary.
- 2. Petitioner's request was denied by the SBA on December 11, 2015 because there is no third election under Florida law. Petitioner timely filed a request for hearing under Chapter 120 and a hearing involving no disputed issues of material fact was scheduled pursuant to section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes (commonly referred to as an "informal hearing").
- 3. At Petitioner's informal hearing, Petitioner raised what the hearing officer considered to be disputed issues of fact. These disputed issues of fact (including whether the Petitioner should be deemed married to a same sex spouse before she transferred to the Investment Plan in 2003) could not be resolved in an informal hearing. Petitioner also argued that the SBA's

denial of her request to return to the Pension Plan violated her constitutional rights, thus implicating the decision of Key Haven Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 427 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1982). Under Key Haven, Petitioner could proceed with her administrative challenge and raise her "as-applied" constitutional challenge before the District Court of Appeal after a final order was issued. Id. at 158. Thus, because this case involved disputed issues of fact and because Petitioner expressed the desire to ultimately raise an "as-applied" constitutional challenge to the SBA's decision on appeal, the case was transferred to the Division of Administrative Hearings ("DOAH") for the assignment of an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") to conduct a hearing involving disputed issues of material fact pursuant to section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

- 4. On August 8, 2016, the day before Petitioner's DOAH hearing was to be held, Petitioner filed a motion asking the ALJ to enter an order declaring that it lacked the jurisdiction to decide the constitutional issues Petitioner raised as well as the authority to require the SBA to pay the difference between the value of Petitioner's Investment Plan account and the Pension Plan buy-back that had been calculated. (See, Petitioner Carol Wartenberg's Request for the Court to Determine Whether it has the Jurisdiction to Grant the Relief Being Requested by the Petitioner, attached hereto as Exhibit A). The Administrative Law Judge promptly granted Petitioner's motion. (See, Order Determining that Relief Requested by Petitioner is Unavailable in an Administrative Proceeding and Closing File, attached hereto as Exhibit B.)
- 5. Respondent finds the DOAH order granting Petitioner's motion to be well-founded and that it should be adopted by a Final Order that dismisses Petitioner's case with prejudice.

WHEREFORE, Respondent, State Board of Administration, respectfully requests that the Order Determining that Relief Requested by Petitioner is Unavailable in an Administrative Proceeding and Closing File should be adopted by a Final Order of Dismissal.

Respectfully submitted,

Brian A. Newman

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Facsimile: (850) 222-3533 Facsimile: (850) 222-2126 Attorneys for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing has been filed via ELECTRONIC MAIL this 12th day of

August, 2016 on:

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Florida State Board of Administration
1801 Hermitage Boulevard, Suite 100
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tina.joanos@sbafla.com
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Anthony V. Falzon, LL.M (Cantab.), Esq. Simon, Schindler & Sandberg, LLC 2650 Biscayne Boulevard Miami, FL 33137 afalzon@maimi-law.net avfassist@maimi-law.net

Brian A. Newman

Attorney

EXHIBIT C

STATE OF FLORIDA STATE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION

CAROL WARTENBERG,

Petitioner,

VS.

Case No. 2016-3123

STATE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION,

Respondent.

PETITIONER CAROL WARTENBERG'S OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

Petitioner, Carol Wartenberg ("Wartenberg") by and through undersigned counsel, hereby files this opposition to Respondent State Board of Administration's Motion for entry of a final order of dismissal with prejudice served August 12, 2016 and in support thereof states as follows:

- 1. On August 11, 2016 the administrative tribunal entered an order determining that the relief requested by Petitioner is unavailable in an administrative proceeding and closing file. See Exhibit B to Respondent's Motion.
- 2. The order also provided for the cancellation of the hearing scheduled for August 12. 2016.
- 3. The administrative tribunal's order did not rule on the merits of Petitioner's claims but simply determined that the administrative tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to grant the relief being requested.
 - 4. It is trite law that an order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, or for improper venue

or even for lack of an indispensable party can never be entered with prejudice because the orders in question do not constitute a ruling on the merits of a parties claims but simply constitute a determination that a court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner Wartenberg requests that the court enter an order denying the relief being sought by the Respondent and allow the order entered on August 11, 2016 to stand unamended or for such other and further relief as this administrative tribunal deems necessary and appropriate. Respectfully Submitted this 15th day of August, 2016.

Anthony V. Falzon

ANTHONY V. FALZON Florida Bar No. 69167 SIMON, SCHINDLER & SANDBERG LLP 2650 Biscayne Boulevard Miami, FL 33137

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished via FedEx on this 15th day of August, 2016 to:

The Honorable Robert E. Meale	850-488-9675
Administrative Law Judge	
Division of Administrative Hearings	
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Pam Bondi	866-966-7226
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State of Florida	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
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By: <u>ANTHONY V. FALZON</u> ANTHONY V. FALZON

Florida Bar No.: 69167

EXHIBIT D

STATE OF FLORIDA STATE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION

CAROL WARTENBERG,

Petitioner,

VS.

CASE NO. 2015-3522

STATE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION, Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO PETITIONER'S OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Respondent, State Board of Administration ("SBA"), files this Reply to Petitioner's Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Final Order of Dismissal, and says:

- 1. Petitioner opposes Respondent's Motion for Final Order of Dismissal to the extent it asks for entry of a final order of dismissal with prejudice.
- 2. The Order Determining that Relief Requested by Petitioner is Unavailable in an Administrative Proceeding and Closing File recommends dismissal of the case in response to Petitioner's clarification of the remedy being sought (which was filed the day before the final hearing). The ALJ properly noted that the Petitioner's clarified request for relief required the SBA "to rewrite clear statutes and rules that prohibit third elections and, at least historically, limited the class of persons who could be named as joint annuitants for an FRS Plan all in reliance on recent court decisions." The ALJ cancelled the final hearing recognizing that neither the SBA nor an ALJ have the power to rewrite the law to give Petitioner that which she now seeks in this administrative proceeding. The ALJ is correct and his recommendation to dismiss the case should be adopted in toto.

¹ Petitioner has not raised any objection to the adoption of the Order Determining that Relief Requested by Petitioner is Unavailable in an Administrative Proceeding and Closing File.

- 3. Heretofore, however, the Petitioner suggested that she may have other grounds to justify her return to the Pension Plan. The SBA has the authority to determine any claim that Petitioner could bring that is founded upon the SBA's alleged misapplication of a Florida statute or rule. The SBA can also determine by final order whether its action should be overturned based upon the application of an unadopted rule and, as of July 1, 2016, can set aside agency action taken pursuant to an invalid rule.² Although it now appears that the Petitioner has abandoned any such claim, she should nevertheless be foreclosed from hereafter raising any claim that is ripe now and within the SBA's power to determine. See, Florida Dep't of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101, 105 (Fla. 2001)(holding that the doctrine of res judicata not only bars issues that were raised, but it also precludes consideration of issues that *could have been raised* but were not raised in the first case); See also, Alderwoods Group, Inc. v. Garcia, 119 So. 3d 497 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)(recognizing that the doctrine of res judicata extends to prior administrative proceedings). And to that extent, the Final Order of Dismissal that is entered should be with prejudice.
- 4. In general terms, a dismissal with prejudice connotes a dismissal on the merits, not a dismissal based upon lack of jurisdiction. See, Schindler v. Barnk of New York Mellon Trust Co., 190 So. 3d 102 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). Moreover, res judicata generally will not apply to bar claims the administrative agency lacked the jurisdiction to resolve. Felder v. State, Dept. of Management Services, Division of Retirement, 993 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). As such, including the statement that the case is dismissed, with prejudice, in the Final Order will not bar the Petitioner from bringing a claim in another forum that the SBA lacked the jurisdiction to resolve.³

² Chapter 2016-116, § 4, Laws of Florida

³ Respondent does not concede that Petitioner has a colorable claim that she can bring in another forum on any ground, including the claim she labels an "as applied" constitutional challenge.

WHEREFORE, Respondent, State Board of Administration, respectfully requests that the Order Determining that Relief Requested by Petitioner is Unavailable in an Administrative Proceeding and Closing File should be adopted by a Final Order of Dismissal and that the Final Order state that the dismissal be with prejudice.

Respectfully submitted,

Brian A. Newman

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Attorneys for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing has been filed via ELECTRONIC MAIL this 7th day of September, 2016 on:

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Brian A. Newman

Attorney

EXHIBIT E

STATE OF FLORIDA STATE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION

CAROL WARTENBERG,

Petitioner,

VS.

Case No. 2016-3123

STATE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION,

Respondent.

PETITIONER CAROL WARTENBERG'S REQUEST FOR THE COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT HAS THE JURISDICTION TO GRANT THE RELIEF BEING REQUESTED BY THE PETITIONER

Petitioner, Carol Wartenberg, requests the court to make a preliminary determination as to whether the court has the jurisdiction to grant the relief being requested by the Petitioner. This request is being made in order to conserve the judicial resources that would be expended in an all day hearing currently scheduled for August 12, 2016. In support thereof Wartenberg states as follows:

1. Wartenberg's case is set out in detail in the Petitioner's Pre-Hearing Statement submitted to the court on August 8, 2016. Essentially Wartenberg is asking for the decisions in *Obergefell v. Hodges* 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that it is a fundamental right protected by the XIV Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for couples of the same sex to be married and for those same sex marriages to be given full faith and credit) and *Brenner v. Scott*, 2015 WL 44260 (N.D. Fla. 2016)(striking down Fla. Stat. 741.212 as unconstitutional) to be applied retroactively.

- 2. Wartenberg requests the court to declare that her 2011 marriage to Hohnecker be backdated to February 18, 1999 the date that Wartenberg and Hohnecker registered their domestic partnership under Broward County's Domestic Partnership Ordinance on the grounds that the declaration of domestic partnership filed under the Ordinance in the presence of a notary public constituted a marriage in all but name under Florida law. This declaration is being sought solely for the purposes of having Hohnecker declared by the court to have been Wartenberg's spouse under Fla. Stat. 121.021(28) and therefore a qualified joint annuitant under the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan under Fla. Stat. 121.091 at the date that Wartenberg exercised her first election in 2003.
- 3. Wartenberg also requests the court to either nullify her second election made in 2008 or grant her a third election to opt back into the pension plan as make whole relief for the injury she suffered when she was unconstitutionally prevented from marrying Hohnecker in 1999 and then unconstitutionally prevented from having Hohnecker recognized as her spouse and joint annuitant under Fla. Stat. 121.021(28) and Fla. Stat. 121.091 when she originally enrolled in the plan in 2003.
- 4. Wartenberg further requests the court to order the Florida Retirement System to pay the difference between the buy in amount for her to return to the pension plan and the value of her Investment Plan.
- 5. An Informal hearing was held before Presiding Officer Longman on February 11, 2016 (Petitioner's Exhibit 25) in which the Presiding Officer made the following observations:

"Generally speaking, when you make a claim under the constitution, and what you're saying is there is a provision of state law that is not constitutional and something different should be done, that is a claim that really cannot be decided in an administrative law forum, which is where you are right now in terms of procedure." Exh 25 pg 19 lines 2-8.

"Obviously in an administrative proceeding, I am not going to be ruling on

constitutional issues except that I believe there is a line of cases about when constitutional issues are raised in the context of an administrative proceeding and it is an as-applied challenge as opposed to a facial challenge, which this is not, that the Petitioner's required to exhaust their administrative remedies. And that means have a hearing on this thing. So, we are having a hearing, but I don't know that we're really getting at any of the issues that are going to be important to deciding this, nor do I know whether we should frankly. And I don't think anybody's really had a chance to look at that the way it maybe has to be looked at." Exh 25. 26:16 - 27:5.

"Well, I understand what you're saying. And again, let me say what my concern is. And I understand what you're saying about looking behind the paper record. But, if there are a bunch of fact issues that are going to ultimately determine whether she has any prospect for relief, I'm not sure whether somebody's supposed to be looking at those fact issues in an administrative proceeding – now, it's not going to be me unless everybody agrees to it, because that's going to be at DOAH. But, you know, instead of saying, looking at her intent, I would say that there's a complex of fact issues that would surround any court making a determination. In other words, were you married when you made this second election? Can you present evidence of your situation at that time? Do you have evidence of this being why you did this? I'm not in any position to say that that would change, you know, or determine the outcome, but it's pretty clearly a fact determination to me.

So, I don't want to prejudice Dr. Wartenberg's ability in some other forum to make her factual case that she may be entitled to some sort of retroactive relief. And there's a lot of, you know, quasi legal terms here. We've got retroactive. I'd be concerned about whether it's speculative, which I think is part of what you are getting to. There would be a lot to prove, I think, under circumstances like this. And I have not looked at what all the law says. And there is law rapidly being developed in other jurisdictions I know that. But my overall concern here is that we not prejudice Dr. Wartenberg's ability to find her way to venue that does have the jurisdiction to answer the questions that she wants answered. I don't think this is it. But I am still troubled by whether the way you get to that venue is for your administrative proceeding to determine facts or to just say, we have our statutes, our statutes don't provide for this, so you have to go somewhere else." Exh25. 28:17-30:7.

"This venue, this tribunal, this hearing, cannot give you the relief that you have asked for. Because we don't have the jurisdiction to do that. I don't have the jurisdiction to decide constitutional issues." *Exh* 25. 32:9-12; 14-15.

6. Petitioner would request the court to enter an order determining that it does not

have the jurisdiction to decide the constitutional issues raised by the Petitioner or the jurisdiction to

grant the relief requested. In doing this the court will be allowing the Petitioner to exhaust her administrative remedies and bring an action in state or federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other related federal statutes.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner, Carol Wartenberg, moves this Honorable Court to enter an order granting the relief requested or for such other and further relief as this court deems necessary and appropriate.

Respectfully Submitted this 8th day of August, 2016.

Anthony V. Falzon

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished via FedEx on this 11th

day of August, 2016 to:

The Honorable Robert E. Meale	850-488-9675
Administrative Law Judge	
Division of Administrative Hearings	
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1230 Apalachee Parkway	
Tallahassee, FL 32399-3060	
Pam Bondi	866-966-7226
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Florida Bar No.: 69167

Exhibit 25

STATE OF FLORIDA STATE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION

CAROL WARTENBERG,

Petitioner,

VS.

CASE NO.: 2015-3522

STATE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION,

Respondent.

GOPY

PROCEEDINGS:

Informal Hearing

BEFORE:

ANNE LONGMAN, HEARING OFFICER

DATE:

Thursday, February 11, 2016

TIME:

Commenced at 1:00 p.m. Concluded at 1:45 p.m.

LOCATION:

1801 Hermitage Blvd.

Tallahassee, FL

REPORTED BY:

Tracy L. Brown

Certified Registered Reporter

tbrown567@comcast.net

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS, INC. 2894-A REMINGTON GREEN LANE TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32308 www.accuratestenotype.com (850) 878-2221

APPEARANCES:

REPRESENTING THE RESPONDENT:

BRANDICE DICKSON, ESQUIRE PENNINGTON PA 215 S. Monroe Street, Suite 200 Tallahassee, FL 32301

INDEX

WITNESS		PAGE
CAR	DL WARTENBERG	
Dire	ect Examination by Ms. Dickson	14
	INDEX OF EXHIBITS	
NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	PAGE
R-1	Letter from Respondent, 2-11-5	20
R-2	Plan Enrollment Form	20
R-3	2nd Election Form	20
R-4	Request for Intervention	20
R-5	Petitioner for Hearing	20
CERTIFICA	TE OF REPORTER	37

1

PROCEEDINGS

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MS. DICKSON: This is Brandi Dickson with the Pennington Law Firm. I'm calling for your hearing before the State Board of Administration.

Can you hear me?

DR. WARTENBERG: Yes, I can.

MS. DICKSON: Okay. We are on speakerphone and we have a court reporter here along with the hearing officer and Mini Watson, who will be the State Board's witness. So with that, if you will just speak more slowly and more clearly than you normally would so the court reporter can get everything down, we are ready to begin your hearing. Okay?

DR. WARTENBERG: I appreciate that because I do wear hearing aids. So loudly and clearly is probably good.

MS. DICKSON: Okay. Thank you.

HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Good. Well, Ms. Wartenberg, my name is Anne Longman, I am presiding officer here today. I need to confirm that you are the Carol Wartenberg who is the Petitioner in case number 2015-3522 before the State of Florida State Board of Administration; is that correct?

DR. WARTENBERG: Yes. Yes, it is.

So which is your preference?

DR. WARTENBERG:

I can go ahead and go first.

HEARING OFFICER: Okay. And I would like to swear in you and Ms. Watson as witnesses here today. So after I say the oath, you will have to answer audibly.

Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you will give today is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

DR. WARTENBERG: Yes.

MS. WATSON: Yes, I do.

HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Thank you.

Ms. Wartenberg, this is what is known as an informal proceeding. We try to make a complete record so that the decision that is ultimately made will be correct. We try to do this in a way that makes sense and that everybody can follow what's going on. Generally speaking, the person who's the Petitioner, which is you, goes first because you have the burden of showing that you're entitled to the relief that you have requested. But if you would prefer to hear the State Board of Administration's case first, I will ask them to do that.

That's fine.

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HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Please just do.

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DR. WARTENBERG: I'm sorry?

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HEARING OFFICER: Please go ahead then.

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Okay. I'm a little nervous

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DR. WARTENBERG: to say the least. But -- and I tried to in my +you know, what I want to bring up now be as clear as possible. Because as I kind of gone through this process, it's become more clear in my head, so I think I'm even able to speak to it even better than when I was originally writing some things out. And I realize that this is all based on my making a second election, but I feel that having to make that second election was based on, you know, discriminatory practices at the time. You know, and it's because of the loss of retirement income over time because I wasn't able to be on the pension plan. And most importantly recently, it's cost me a loss of income because since I'm in the investment plan, I can't participate in the DROP program, which is just furthering my sense of feeling discriminated against.

election of the pension, you know, I -- you know,

living in Broward County, we had the domestic

You know, at the time that I made the first

partnership, you know, enactment that was there. So the whole time that I was employed by the Broward School Board, my wife and I have been covered under the Broward domestic partner. We've been together for 30 years. And as soon as you could marry, we went out of state and married. So, for all intents and purposes, even if we looked at common law, you know, we have been wife and wife, partners, for a good long period of time. And we feel — I feel that I'm being discriminated against because I've had a commitment to this person who, of course, nobody wanted to recognized. So I

Now, in Broward County, we're recognized, so I think I just assumed that she was covered under the pension plan until I was discussing it with somebody and they said, well, of course she's not because the Florida Retirement System doesn't follow Broward County law, they follow Florida law. And that's when I figured out that I -- you know, if something were to happen to me, that she would have, you know, no benefits. She would have nothing from the money that I had put into the plan up until that point.

I guess the only thing that I could say is that I really feel that this decision should be

made retroactively. There is a lot of movement in this country right now to restore benefits retroactively to people who have lost benefits due to their sexual preference or due to marriage and equality. And I just reviewed some of the things that I found in our gay local news, so I don't have documents or anything to support it, but for example, I know that many veterans are now getting their benefits restored based on having been discharged during don't ask, don't tell. And one individual as long as 50 years ago was thrown out of the army because of his sexual preference and they are currently restoring his benefits et cetera and reinstated him as a veteran. Social security is also now allowing some

Social security is also now allowing some same—sex partners to retroactively file social security claims based on their spouse's benefits. The Department of Justice on January 29th determined that their employees that had been discriminated against should be — and the quote was "be made whole" and receive benefits retroactively.

There's been also retroactive decision to allow a same-sex spouse to receive survivor annuity benefits from the Department of Veteran Affairs.

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The Arista Retirement plans have indicated that employers may be retroactively liable for denying spousal benefits before the marriage equality decision was made. And there's been all sorts of reversals on denied tuition and immigration status -- well, not all sorts, I don't know how I don't want to be inaccurate there. But there have been decisions based on, you know, tuition and immigration status having been denied to same-sex partners. And currently Walmart and several private companies are being sued for retroactive benefits. And many employers are now considering what they're calling equalization benefits to compensate their employees for benefits that could not claim for their same-sex spouses while the more restrictive laws were in place.

You know, even right now, there's retroactive changes being applied to individuals who were incarcerated for drug violations. So there is some precedent for reinstating benefits retroactively, based on, you know, past discriminatory practices.

And in all -- I'd at least be able -- like to be able to go on trial because right now, that's a problem for me. And, you know, I've always been concerned, upset that my retirement income has had

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to be based on vagaries of the market because I had to go to the -- help me out here.

HEARING OFFICER: The investment plan, yeah.

DR. WARTENBERG: Yeah, the investment plan! And even with expert advice that I've sought out, you know, it's been up and down and, you know, as I get closer and closer to my retirement age, you know, that's a concern. And it just -- I just feel like, you know, to some degree, you know, we've been punished for our commitment to each other and not getting these benefits like our, you know, heterosexual counterparts have always been able to get without question, you know, without even having to show any sort of documentation or proof.

So I guess that's why I decided to continue on at this point. And I probably don't have a snowball's chance in hell, but I thought I'd present my case and see what might happen, so --

HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Well, let me --

DR. WARTENBERG: I'm done. Thank you.

HEARING OFFICER: Yes. And if I could clarify some things, I will then turn it over to Ms. Dickson. And we will come back to you, so don't worry that --

DR. WARTENBERG: Yeah, no problem.

HEARING OFFICER: -- if there are other things 1 2 you want to say. 3 DR. WARTENBERG: Yeah, I've been in IEP 4 meetings and things like that. 5 HEARING OFFICER: Yeah. Okay. So you say that you have approximately 30 years in FRS? 6 7 DR. WARTENBERG: I'm sorry, say again. HEARING OFFICER: Do you have 30 years in FRS? 8 9 DR. WARTENBERG: Oh, no, no. Not at all. 10 HEARING OFFICER: Oh, you've been married for 11 30 years. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. DR. WARTENBERG: I've been married for 30 12 13 years, yes. 14 HEARING OFFICER: So let me -- I just wanted 15 to get some dates down here. 16 DR. WARTENBERG: Okay. 17 HEARING OFFICER: You said that -- oh, you had 18 a domestic partnership under Broward County 19 ordinances. When was that? When did that begin. 20 DR. WARTENBERG: Oh, heavens. That was 21 passed -- I don't know the exact year, I'm really 22 sorry, but it was past prior to my becoming a 23 Broward County School system employee. I'd have 24 to, you know, go back and figure out the exact date 25 of that.

HEARING OFFICER: But were you required to do anything, like register to take advantage of that?

DR. WARTENBERG: Yes.

HEARING OFFICER: So do you know when that occurred?

DR. WARTENBERG: Oh, heavens, let me -- I didn't realize I needed --

HEARING OFFICER: Well, I don't need an exact date, I'm just trying to get a flow here. So even if --

DR. WARTENBERG: Yes, exactly. We were registered. It is on county law. I even have a -- you know where I might have it is in my wallet because I still carry that because they give you a little -- they gave you a card at the time so it's like if you were in the hospital or anything like that --

HEARING OFFICER: Right.

DR. WARTENBERG: -- we were able to demonstrate at the hospital that, you know, you did have those benefits. And I think I might be able to find that. Man, where did I put that? I still used to carry it because I never knew if possible even -- here it is. Good. It was the 13th day of August, 1999.

1	HEARING OFFICER: Okay.
2	DR. WARTENBERG: And the file number I'm
3	sorry, do you want the file number?
4	HEARING OFFICER: No, that's not necessary.
5	DR. WARTENBERG: Okay.
6	HEARING OFFICER: And let me ask you this
7	then, and again, approximate is all right, what was
8	the date that you went out of state and married and
9	where?
10	DR. WARTENBERG: Oh, I know that for sure.
11	That was July 15 th , 2018. [1]
12	HEARING OFFICER: Okay. And where was that?
13	DR. WARTENBERG: Iowa.
14	HEARING OFFICER: In Iowa, okay.
15	DR. WARTENBERG: Hard to believe, huh.
16	HEARING OFFICER: Yes. I think that's all I
17	have for now.
18	Ms. Dickson, if you would go ahead.
19	MS. DICKSON: Thank you.
20	Ms. Wartenberg, I want to confirm
21	DR. WARTENBERG: It's Dr. Wartenberg actually.
22	MS. DICKSON: I'm sorry. Dr. Wartenberg.
23	DR. WARTENBERG: That's all right. We want to
24	be correct.
25	MS. DICKSON: All right. Dr. Wartenberg, I

want to make sure that you received a copy in advance of the hearing of the Respondent's prehearing statement as well as our notice of filing exhibits and witness list.

Did you receive those two items?

DR. WARTENBERG: Yes, I did.

MS. DICKSON: Okay. And I will be looking at the Respondent's prehearing statement. So if you would like to follow along with me, we can literally be on the same page, okay?

DR. WARTENBERG: Actually I have the device that has that information up to my ear right now, so I won't be able to follow along, but I'll be comfortable with you going ahead and going over it. Because I'd read it through pretty carefully.

MS. DICKSON: All right.

DR. WARTENBERG: Is that okay?

MS. DICKSON: That's fine. That's fine.

The issue to be resolved today is whether

Dr. Wartenberg's request to switch from the FRS

investment plan to the pension plan, despite having
no elections remaining, should be granted.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MS. DICKSON:

Q Dr. Wartenberg, do you agree that you were

- 1 employed by the Broward County School Board and given a 2 deadline of December 29, 2003 to elect between the pension plan and the investment plan? 4 A Yes. I can't -- to be honest with you, can't
 - clearly remember how that all went about, but, you know, if that's the way it typically happens, then I'm sure that's what happened.
 - Okay. And if you --Q
 - A I don't remember.
- And you elected to join the pension plan on 10 December 22nd, 2003, correct? 11
 - A Right.
 - And then on May 7th, 2008, you filed a second election form to switch from the pension plan to the investment plan, correct?
 - A Yes.

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- And you understood at that time, that by filing that second election, you had to stay in the investment plan until your retirement, correct?
 - A Right.
- In other words, you understood that that decision was irrevocable, correct?
 - A Yes.
 - And now you --Q
 - A Because other people have thought that decisions

were -- you're going to come back to me, I'm sorry.

Q That's okay.

A I'm just saying, you know, that decision was made on, you know, trying to protect my wife at the time and would not — I would not have switched if I were able, like every heterosexual couple, to have made her my beneficiary but I couldn't do that, so I had to protect her. So I feel that I made the second election due to discrimination at the time. And would never have changed by first election if I didn't have to.

Q I understand.

And --

A Like the military has thrown people out and now they're saying, yeah, that probably shouldn't have happened.

Q I understand.

Have you read the statutory provision that is found at Section 121.4501(4)(g) Florida Statutes that was included in the Respondent's prehearing statement?

- A Would you remind me what that said again?
- Q Sure. It's in our prehearing statement on the third page, and it's Section 121.4501(4)(g). And it states that after you make your initial election, you have remaining to you a single election to switch between plans, and there are no exceptions to that.

Do you recall reading that statute?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And there is a grace period afforded if you believe that you have made that decision incorrectly, but you have to notify the SBA within about a 30-day period. And you agree with me that that did not happen in this case, correct?

A Right. Because I at that time thought I had no other option than to choose the investment plan.

Q So do you understand that there's no statutory provision for the State Board of Administration to grant you the relief that you are requesting today?

A Yes, I understand that.

Q And do you understand that the State Board of Administration has no authority to deviate from that statute and grant you the relief that you request today?

A So even though it was based on discriminatory practices, that, what, that can only be changed if, you know, the State of Florida change its statutory -- is that --

Q Well, the State Board of Administration is an agency of the State and can only do those things which are authorized by statute. And there is no authority in the statute that allows the SBA to do what you are asking it to do.

A So, Florida Statute cannot be changed retroactively based on, you know, it's now currently recognizing that same-sex couples should have the right to be married?

Q I can't speak for what the legislature could do in the future. But as we sit here today, there is no authority that the SBA has to grant you the relief that you have requested.

A So it would have to be through statutory change?

HEARING OFFICER: Well, let me -- this is Anne

Longman again, Dr. Wartenberg.

DR. WARTENBERG: Sure. I'm just trying to understand.

HEARING OFFICER: Yes. And I want you to understand. And I frankly am trying to understand because this is not an issue that I have followed with regard to the application of these new court cases on State of Florida retirement benefits. So, I think that what we have here today is that your claim, your assertion under your petition is based on a constitutional right. It's a right that has been determined by the United States Supreme Court. It was —

DR. WARTENBERG: Right.

HEARING OFFICER: It was first determined by a

local district court, federal district court here.

So, generally speaking, when you make a claim under the constitution, and what you're saying is there is a provision of state law that is not constitutional and something different should be done, that is a claim that really cannot be decided in an administrative law forum, which is where you are right now in terms of procedure.

So, if you would bear with me for a minute, I need to get just a little bit better understanding of the facts here before --

DR. WARTENBERG: Sure.

HEARING OFFICER: -- I'm going to be comfortable.

And, Ms. Dickson, would you be all right with me questioning Ms. Watson or would you rather I direct the questions to you?

DR. WARTENBERG: I'm sorry, could you repeat that?

HEARING OFFICER: I'm --

DR. WARTENBERG: I lost --

HEARING OFFICER: Yeah, I'm going to ask, as the presiding officer, I would like to ask

Ms. Watson, who is the representative for the State Board of Administration a few questions.

1 DR. WARTENBERG: Okay. 2 HEARING OFFICER: Okay. 3 MS. DICKSON: And that's fine. Just from a housekeeping perspective, can we get the exhibits 4 in before I turn over? 5 6 **HEARING OFFICER:** Sure. 7 MS. DICKSON: Dr. Wartenberg, I also want to 8 confirm that you received a copy of the exhibits 9 that we sent prior to the hearing? And those were 10 premarked as Respondent's Exhibits R-1 through R-5. 11 DR. WARTENBERG: Yes, I did. 12 MS. DICKSON: Okay. At this time, I would 13 like to admit those into evidence. 14 **HEARING OFFICER:** Okay. Dr. Wartenberg, this 15 is just to put those documents into the record. you have any objection to that? 16 17 DR. WARTENBERG: No, not at all. 18 HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Without objection, 19 they're admitted. 20 (Respondent's Exhibit Nos. R-1 through R-5 admitted into the record.) 21 22 MS. DICKSON: And that might assist you in 23 getting some of these facts down, particularly 24 Dr. Wartenberg's assertion that she did not use her 25 initial election. Exhibit R-2 demonstrates that

she did affirmatively use her initial election to go into the pension plan. She did not default, she affirmatively chose --

DR. WARTENBERG: I was confused about that because I couldn't remember exactly how that occurred — as you indicated, you know, that was the procedure that — so that's what I'm saying, that must have happened, even though I couldn't recollect it exactly. I thought I was just put into the pension plan, but I couldn't remember having elected that, but obviously I did.

HEARING OFFICER: Okay. All right.

Ms. Watson, forgive me if this seems a little far afield, and I know that this is not necessarily something you prepared for today.

DR. WARTENBERG: Just a second, let me close the door.

Go ahead.

HEARING OFFICER: Okay. If Dr. Wartenberg had been legally married within the eyes of the law when she made her initial election in 2003, what effect would that have had with regard to the rights that she now seeks? In other words, a beneficiary, a right to leave your retirement assets to your spouse?

have

DR. WARTENBERG: And be able to leave the DROP program --

HEARING OFFICER: Okay. We'll get to that.

One thing at time.

DR. WARTENBERG: I'm sorry. Forgive me.

MS. WATSON: Under the pension plan, a joint annuitant is defined as a spouse or a child 25 years or under. So, if something were to happen to someone in the pension plan, the benefits would go first to their spouse. So, if she was in the pension plan and the law recognized her as being married, and having a spouse, then they would receive the same benefit as any other spouse would receive.

HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Is that automatic or do you have to say, if I die, give this money to my spouse and my children?

MS. WATSON: It depends on what benefit you're seeking. So if something were to happen before the pension plan member receives — is retirement eligible, then it automatically defaults to Florida law to —

HEARING OFFICER: Spouse.

MS. WATSON: Spouse.

HEARING OFFICER: Okay.

MS. WATSON: If the member goes to retire, they can — there are certain options. They can designate someone else to receive that benefit. However, option — different options require them to have a spouse in order to receive a benefit. So if they didn't have a spouse and they wanted option three, then if there was not a joint annuitant, then there would be no one to give it to.

HEARING OFFICER: Okay.

MS. WATSON: Does that make sense?

HEARING OFFICER: It does. Although I will tell you I've done a little bit of poking around on this trying to get a framework for thinking about it and it's fairly dense. If I have this right, there are certain or there were certain benefits that would flow automatically to a spouse without their having to be further action on the part of the participant.

MS. WATSON: Correct. Well, it depends if they're going to action the retirement or if there is a death. At that point, of course, the spouse would say, I'm the spouse, I receive benefits. So, it just depends on the situation.

Now, as far as --

DR. WARTENBERG: Could I just -- could I ask

1 something?

HEARING OFFICER:

my husband?

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DR. WARTENBERG: If I came in as a heterosexual person and opted for the pension plan, I would not have had to let you know at that moment in time who my husband was or that I had a husband, but just that I was electing the pension plan and at some point in time if I should die or whatever, the pension plan would have automatically gone to

NO.

MS. WATSON: It would have, but your husband or your spouse would have had to provide documentation that they were your spouse. The same thing --

DR. WARTENBERG: Right, but at the time that I died.

MS. WATSON: That is correct. The same thing is when you go to retire, you have to provide documentation that that -- when that person receives your benefit and you were to pass away, they would have to provide documentation that they were your spouse regardless --

DR. WARTENBERG: Not on the front end, on the back end?

HEARING OFFICER: Right. Okay,

Dr. Wartenberg, we've got to do this one at a time. So let me ask these questions now.

DR. WARTENBERG:

I'm sorry.

HEARING OFFICER: I think I do understand that. And frankly, I don't know that I need to understand it in all details. I don't think there's much question, but what -- the situation now is different.

Can you explain to me what the situation is

MS. WATSON: Sure. So they process retirements. The retirement process is exactly the same as it was before, however, you show documentation that someone is your spouse, whether — which would be a marriage license. And so where before, the State or the — did not recognize same—sex marriage, well, now the state recognizes same—sex marriage, therefore the participants receive a marriage license. So the participants would just submit a marriage license regardless of where they received it at. They have a marriage license, then they would receive benefits based on the marriage license.

HEARING OFFICER: Right. And the way that I say that would be now there's more than one kind of

spouse. But the way that all of this happens has not really changed, what has changed is who is the spouse.

MS. WATSON: Correct.

HEARING OFFICER: Is that accurate?

MS. WATSON: Correct.

HEARING OFFICER: Okay. All right. Well, I do understand that.

Ms. Dickson, the thing that's giving me a problem here is that I do know that this is really exactly the same kind of fact pattern that has come up in a number of cases with regard to how this newly recognized right is going to affect people's retirement benefits, all kinds of government benefits.

Obviously in an administrative proceeding, I am not going to be ruling on constitutional issues except that I believe there is a line of cases about when constitutional issues are raised in the context of an administrative proceeding and it is an as-applied challenge as opposed to a facial challenge, which this is not, that the Petitioner's required to exhaust their administrative remedies. And that means have a hearing on this thing. So, we are having a hearing, but I don't know that

we're really getting at any of the issues that are going to be important to deciding this, nor do I know whether we should frankly. And I don't think anybody's really had a chance to look at that the way it maybe has to be looked at.

Do you have any response to that?

DR. WARTENBERG: -- I don't think I'll be the first person to bring this up.

HEARING OFFICER: No, you are not the first person. And I'm aware of at least that much. But we have to do this, you know, within the bounds of the laws and the procedural rules that we're supposed to follow.

DR. WARTENBERG: Sure.

MS. DICKSON: It's the SBA's position that they're not going to look behind the intent of a member for selecting one plan over the other. By way of example, people try to time the market. And they may have joined the investment plan thinking they were going to enter the market when it was low, ride it until it's high. They misunderstood what the market was going to do, they wanted to change their minds and go back to the pension plan, but they're out of elections. So the SBA cannot and will not look to the intent of members'

decisions to switch plans. And that's why the statute has to be clear. You have one time.

HEARING OFFICER: Right.

MS. DICKSON: One opportunity. And if you think you did it errantly, before we move money, tell us and we can change it back. But the SBA cannot be put into a position to divine intent. And at this point, that's what Dr. Wartenberg is asking the SBA to do is to divine her intent based open the two paper elections that she filed.

HEARING OFFICER: Right.

MS. DICKSON: And that's why the SBA is constrained to deny the relief that she is requesting. And it might be that she has a different forum to bring these issues, but in this particular forum, the relief cannot be granted.

HEARING OFFICER: Well, I understand what you're saying. And again, let me say what my concern is. And I understand what you're saying about looking behind the paper record. But, if there are a bunch of fact issues that are going to ultimately determine whether she has any prospect for relief, I'm not sure whether somebody's supposed to be looking at those fact issues in an administrative proceeding — now, it's not going to

be me unless everybody agrees to it, because that's going to be at DOAH. But, you know, instead of saying, looking at her intent, I would say that there's a complex of fact issues that would surround any court making a determination. In other words, were you married when you made this second election? Can you present evidence of your situation at that time? Do you have evidence of this being why you did this? I'm not in any position to say that that would change, you know, or determine the outcome, but it's pretty clearly a fact determination to me.

So, I don't want to prejudice Dr. Wartenberg's ability in some other forum to make her factual case that she may be entitled to some sort of retroactive relief. And there's a lot of, you know, quasi legal terms here. We've got retroactive. I'd be concerned about whether it's speculative, which I think is part of what you are getting to. There would be a lot to prove, I think, under a circumstance like this. And I have not looked at what all the law says. And there is law rapidly being developed in other jurisdictions, I know that. But my overall concern here is that we not prejudice Dr. Wartenberg's ability to find

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her way to a venue that does have the jurisdiction to answer the questions that she wants answered. don't think this is it. But I am still troubled by whether the way you get to that venue is for your administrative proceeding to determine facts or to just say, we have our statutes, our statutes don't provide for this, so you have to go somewhere else.

DR. WARTENBERG: Because then it --

HEARING OFFICER: Go ahead. Go ahead, please.

DR. WARTENBERG: Because then at that point, if I have to -- and I don't know what the next thing would be, but I have limited income, so to be able to pursue this, would become costly to me and I don't know how to do that or that -- you know what I mean?

HEARING OFFICER: Yes, I do.

I guess I'm just saying to DR. WARTENBERG: y'all, you know, it just doesn't seem fair to me. And, you know, it certainly wasn't because I preferred the investment plan. In fact, I really hated the idea of having to come off the pension plan. And you know, I've suffered over it ever since. And when finally the State of Florida recognized my marriage and then the United States of America recognized my marriage, I just feel that

I have this right, of course, to present this petition on my part. Yeah.

HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Well, I absolutely understand what you're saying, and I know that the idea of a legal action, you know, where you really do need an attorney to represent you is pretty daunting.

I think we have the record insofar as we were prepared to make a record today.

Ms. Dickson, do you have any further thoughts?

Ms. Dickson: Nope. No thoughts.

HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Okay. Well, here's what I'm going to do, and this is a little bit unusual. I think we don't have much in the record here today other than the pretty clearly undisputed facts that are reflected on the pieces of paper which nobody disputes. So, that's — in some sense, that's good. There's no dispute about that.

Dr. Wartenberg, what we generally do is we get a transcript of the proceeding. The transcript's provided both to you and to the SBA. And then you have 30 days from the receipt of the transcript to file anything else that you want to file by way of argument saying this is why I think I should prevail. You don't have to file anything else.

There's no obligation to do that.

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DR. WARTENBERG: Well, if I were to do that, would I need like the like legal precedent documents, et cetera that demonstrate that retroactive benefits are being at this time looked at and reconsidered and changed in other localities and venues?

HEARING OFFICER: I can't tell you that that's what you would have to do. Because this venue, this tribunal, this hearing, cannot give you the relief that you have asked for. Because we don't have the jurisdiction to do that.

DR. WARTENBERG: Right.

HEARING OFFICER: I don't have the jurisdiction to decide constitutional issues. But what I'm struggling with here is, Ms. Dickson, lawyer to lawyer, I would appreciate some assistance perhaps before a proposed recommended order is filed, on the question of what is the proper thing to do with a constitutional issue that is raised in an informal hearing. Meaning, there is no dispute of fact as to what actually occurred, but there may be fact disputes as to whether the constitutional prohibition gets her the relief that she has asked for. I hope that makes sense.

MS. DICKSON: It does.

of cases about what you do with constitutional issues that are embedded in administrative proceedings. And I think the law, frankly, has been a little bit all over the place, which is why I don't feel comfortable just sailing into this without having the chance to really flesh out the issue.

So, do you think you could get that within two weeks?

MS. DICKSON: Sure.

HEARING OFFICER: I don't think there's anything about the transcript that is going to help us in that regard.

MS. DICKSON: I agree.

HEARING OFFICER: And I also think it's important to do this because I do suspect that there are going to be more of these cases. It's a good thing to know going forward.

So, Dr. Wartenberg, what's going to happen here is that Ms. Dickson, as the attorney for the State Board of Administration, is going to brief — meaning create a legal document that contains the law, the state of the present law with regard to

1 how claims like yours should be addressed in these 2 kinds of administrative hearings. So you'll get a 3 copy of that within approximately two weeks. And 4 what I am going to do then is take a look at that. 5 You can certainly respond to that document if you 6 want to, but that would be more of a legal 7 argument. But I'm going to take a look at that document and then I am going to issue an order 8 9 setting the procedure for going forward from that 10 point. 11 DR. WARTENBERG: HEARING OFFICER: I hope that makes sense to 12 13 you. 14 DR. WARTENBERG: Yes, it does.

HEARING OFFICER: Okay.

DR. WARTENBERG: And if I have questions about that, I can call and ask them and that kind of thing?

HEARING OFFICER: Yes, yes.

DR. WARTENBERG: Can that also be sent to me on paper as well as by email? Because I guess, you know, I'm 63, I'm a short-timer now before retirement, that's why this to some degree is of some, you know, timeliness to me.

HEARING OFFICER: Yes.

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DR. WARTENBERG: So I still like paper copies. If that could possibly be sent to me via the mail as well as email, I appreciate that. And I still continue to have questions about the DROP program, you know, because that's also been, you know -- you know what I mean, the people that are able to make these huge amounts of extra money for their retirement based on them being heterosexual versus being, you know, homosexual and not being able to be in the retirement plan.

HEARING OFFICER: Well, I understand that that's embedded in your petition, so I think you've adequately raised that and as far as I can tell, that would be determined by the same set of questions that we're trying to get to here.

DR. WARTENBERG: Okay.

HEARING OFFICER: So I think you're good on that.

DR. WARTENBERG: Great. Thank you.

HEARING OFFICER: So you don't have any trouble with providing paper copies?

MS. DICKSON: That's fine.

DR. WARTENBERG: Thank you.

HEARING OFFICER: I think we do want to go ahead and get the transcript out, just go ahead and

send it to everybody. But instead of having a 1 30-day time period to submit a PRO, we're going to 2 wait until we all look at this legal argument. 3 going to make another order then saying what 5 happens from there. Okay. 6 MS. DICKSON: Okay. 7 DR. WARTENBERG: Thank you very much. **HEARING OFFICER:** Yes. Anything further? 8 9 MS. DICKSON: Not from the SBA. 10 DR. WARTENBERG: Are you asking me? 11 HEARING OFFICER: Yes, I am asking you also. 12 DR. WARTENBERG: Okay. No, I appreciate y all 13 hearing me out. And I pretty much figured that 14 kind of the situation will come about. But I do 15 truly appreciate the addition that you're talking 16 about, so thank you. 17 HEARING OFFICER: Thank you all and we will be 18 adjourned. 19 (Hearing adjourned at 1:45 p.m.) 20 21 22 23 24 25

37 1 CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 2 3 4 STATE OF FLORIDA: 5 COUNTY OF LEON: 6 I, TRACY L. BROWN, court reporter and Notary 7 Public do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings 8 were taken before me at the time and place therein 9 10 designated, and that the foregoing pages numbered 1 through are a true and correct record of the aforesaid proceedings. 11 I further certify that I am not a relative, 12 employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am 13 I a relative or employee of any of the parties' attorney or 14 counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially 15 interested in the foregoing action. 16 DATED THIS 29th day of Cebru my, 2016. 17 18 19 20 21 TRACY L. BROWN

TRACY L. BROWN 2894-A Remington Green Lane Tallahassee, FL 32308 (850) 878-2221

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August 3, 2016

By FedEx to:

The Honorable Robert E. Meale Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-3060

Re: Wartenberg, Carol v State Board of Administration

Case No.:16-3123

Dear Judge Meale:

Enclosed please find a binder with a copy of Petitioner Carol Wartenberg's proposed exhibits as well as a courtesy copy of Petitioner's Pre-Hearing Statement and Notice of Filing Exhibits.

Veryitruly yours,

AVF:va Encls. Y ∜. FALZON